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The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is 
its lifeblood.  The minister is the chief instrument by which the 
church seeks to fulfill its purpose.  Matters touching this 
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime 
ecclesiastical concern.1 
–Judge James P. Coleman 
[E]ven though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still 
have a dream.  It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.  
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the 
true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal.”2 
–Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most challenging aspects of American jurisprudence is 
resolving a question that involves two conflicting fundamental rights.  
Whether those rights are codified in a statute or in the United States 
Constitution, courts must decide which “self-evident truth” trumps another, a 
difficult proposition at best.  When the right of religious freedom3 crosses 
the right of an American citizen to equal protection of the laws in the form 
of anti-discrimination statutes,4 courts must answer this question. 
For the past forty years, the circuit courts have consistently held that, 
when it comes to a religious organization’s relationship with its ministers, 
religious freedom must surpass the government’s interest in eliminating 
 
 1.  McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 2.  Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at Civil Rights March on Washington 
(Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf 
 3.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
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discrimination.5  The Supreme Court has articulated that idea in the form of 
the ministerial exception—the right of churches and other religious 
organizations to select their leaders free from any government interference.6  
This proposition is simple enough.  It is grounded in the idea of church 
autonomy, a concept espoused by the Court for well over a century.7  
However, the resolution of this question inevitably leads to a much more 
difficult one: who and what exactly is a minister?  And, equally importantly, 
who decides?  The circuit courts have attempted to answer those questions 
since the Fifth Circuit first adopted the exception in 1972, without any clear 
or consistent results.8  Some courts have adopted a “primary duties test” that 
has led to inconsistency, sometimes within one circuit.9  Other courts adhere 
to a strict scrutiny standard of review that violates the Establishment Clause 
through excessive entanglement.10 
The Supreme Court recently examined the exception for the first time in 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,11 and, 
although it confirmed the existence of the ministerial exception, the Court’s 
unwillingness to define a clear test and put the issue to rest exemplifies the 
complex nature of these questions.12  It is the complexity of the issue that 
ensures no bright-line rule will work 100% of the time, making an ad hoc 
test the only solution that stays true to the Religion Clauses in which the 
ministerial exception is rooted.13 
This Comment examines the application of the ministerial exception to 
religious organizations when the question of whether the employee is a 
minister is unclear.  Part II explores the history of the ministerial exception.14  
Part III examines current ministerial exception jurisprudence in the circuit 
 
 5.  See infra Parts II.C, III.A. 
 6.  See infra Part II.C. 
 7.  See infra Part II.A.2.a. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part III.B.1 (containing a full discussion of the problems with the primary duties 
test). 
 10.  See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the application of a judicial standard of review, specifically 
strict scrutiny); see also infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Establishment Clause and excessive 
entanglement). 
 11.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 12.  See infra Part III.C.2 (analyzing the Court’s Hosanna-Tabor opinion). 
 13.  See infra Part IV (discussing the application of an ad hoc test); see also infra Part II (tracing 
the evolution of the ministerial exception from the Religion Clauses to the church autonomy doctrine 
to the first articulation of the exception in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
 14.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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courts as well as the Supreme Court’s Hosanna-Tabor decision.15  Part IV 
scrutinizes the potential impact of the decision and suggests a sensible, ad 
hoc ministerial employee test before briefly concluding.16 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The search for a sensible ministerial exception test must begin at its 
roots: the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment to the Constitution.17  By 
examining the history of the ministerial exception, jurists can find its 
original spirit and succeed in establishing a test that stays true to that spirit.18 
A.  The Religion Clauses 
The First Amendment to the Constitution states, in relevant part, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”19  The Framers debated the exact 
wording of these Religion Clauses before they officially adopted the final 
version that appears in the Bill of Rights.20  The language was derived, in the 
main, from existing state constitutions that reflected American views at the 
time on the importance of protecting religious freedom.21 
 
 15.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 16.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 17.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infra Part II.C. 
 18.  See infra Part IV. 
 19.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 20.  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481 (1990).  Most notably absent from the end of the Free 
Exercise Clause is the phrase “or to infringe the rights of conscience,” which was originally adopted 
by the House of Representatives.  Id. at 1482–84.  Subsequently, bicameral passage required a 
conference committee vote wherein the final version was ratified.  Id.  “Free exercise of religion” is 
the more precise phrase of the two, which may have had something to do with its passage.  “Free 
exercise” unambiguously refers to action, rather than a passive belief system, indicating protection 
for the practice of beliefs.  Id. at 1488.  “Rights of conscience” may also have been rejected because 
it is ambiguous in a way that suggests a belief system based on something other than religion may be 
covered by the Clause.  Id.  The Supreme Court reinforced this conclusion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972), when it held that a belief system cannot be based on secular considerations to 
fall under the protection of the Religion Clauses—it must be based in religious belief. 
 21.  McConnell, supra note 20, at 1456.  With the exception of Connecticut (the only state with 
no free exercise clause in its constitution), the states as a whole recognized religious freedom as an 
inalienable right.  Id. at 1455.  Common elements appear in each of these state constitutional 
provisions describing both the scope and the limits of the liberties enumerated.  Id. at 1458–62. 
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1.  The Establishment Clause 
Many times the Religion Clauses are separated and analyzed in 
accordance with which is triggered by the facts of the case before the court.22  
The landmark case for the Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman,23 
where the Court created a three-part test to determine whether certain state 
statutes violated the Establishment Clause.24  In Lemon, two statutes that 
gave state funding to nonpublic schools were held to be unconstitutional 
because “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the 
statutes in each State involve[d] excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.”25  While the statutes themselves delegated funds 
to teachers who taught only non-religious material, statistics showed that the 
sole beneficiaries of the statutes were Roman Catholic schools.26 
The Lemon Court identified “three main evils” the Establishment Clause 
was intended to combat: “sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”27  Accordingly, the Court 
delineated a three-part test under which courts should analyze all 
Establishment Clause issues.28  “First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”29  Although the Court 
 
 22.  See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 23.  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 24.  Id. at 612–13.  The two statutes were separate, one from Rhode Island and one from 
Pennsylvania.  Id. at 607–10.  Both dealt with government funding to nonpublic schools, and both 
had the cumulative effect of providing state funding to Catholic parochial schools.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 614.  The Court recognized that, while technically meeting the mandate that the funds 
only be available to teachers who taught non-religious subjects, the support was so permeating and 
the religious goals of the Catholic parochial schools so significant, that the end result could not be 
overlooked.  Id. at 613.  In essence, the Court looked past the goal or stated purpose of the statute to 
the primary effect of the statute to find that the state was in fact sponsoring religion by funding the 
parochial schools.  Id. at 614. 
 26.  Id. at 608.  The statistics supporting this finding were similar for both states.  In Rhode 
Island, 25% of students attended nonpublic schools, and 95% of those attended Roman Catholic 
schools.  Id.  At the time of the decision, all 250 teachers claiming benefits under the statute were 
employed by Roman Catholic schools.  Id.  In Pennsylvania, 20% of students attended nonpublic 
schools, and 96% of those attended “church-related schools,” most of which were Roman Catholic.  
Id. at 610. 
 27.  Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).  The phrase “excessive 
entanglement”—now tied to this case and the “Lemon test”—originated in Walz.  See Walz, 397 U.S. 
at 668. 
 28.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 29.  Id. (citation omitted).  The Court later established a sub-test within part three of the Lemon 
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found that the statutes clearly had a secular purpose and declined to analyze 
the second part of the test, it did conclude that the third part was not met.30  
Given the nature of the parochial school system within the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Court found that the statutes promoted the Roman Catholic 
faith, resulting in excessive entanglement.31 
2.  The Free Exercise Clause 
There are two lines of case precedent stemming from the Free Exercise 
Clause.32  The first deals with internal management and affairs relating to 
church governance, which courts articulate as the church autonomy 
doctrine.33  The second deals with the individual free exercise of religion 
protected by the First Amendment.34  When analyzing a Free Exercise 
Clause issue, distinguishing between the two lines of cases and deciding 
which to follow becomes of paramount importance.35 
 
test for entanglement.  Id. at 615.  Because the Establishment Clause is not the focus of this 
Comment, this test will be identified but not discussed in detail.  The court must examine (1) “the 
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,” (2) “the nature of the aid that the State 
provides,” and (3) “the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.”  
Id.  In application, the Court found that the character and purpose of the schools was so pervasively 
religious that the nature of the aid did not effectively separate the funding from the promotion of the 
Catholic faith.  Id. at 615–20.  There was no guaranteed way to separate one teacher who taught both 
secular and religious subjects in her use of textbooks and salaries.  Despite the stipulation that the 
money only fund non-religious endeavors within the school, the primary goals of the Roman 
Catholic school system were too religious for this mandated separation to be realistic in practical 
application.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 613–14.  The Court dismissed the first part of the test with ease, classifying the 
purpose of the statutes as a secular one.  Id.  It then thoroughly analyzed the third part of the test, but 
spent little time addressing the second part of the test.  Id. at 614.  The Court acknowledged a 
balancing effect between the primarily religious mission of the parochial schools and precautions 
taken by the legislatures to prevent entanglement through its overarching goal but declined to take 
the point further given that the third element analysis was dispositive.  Id. at 613–15. 
 31.  Id. at 609; see supra note 25. 
 32.  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  More specifically, the 
court presented these two separate strands of law as arising purely under the Free Exercise Clause.  
Id.  The court later analyzed the case at bar separately under the Establishment Clause and the three-
part test identified in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 465. 
 33.  See discussion infra Part II.A.2.a.; see also, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese 
of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing the church autonomy line of cases and the 
well established principle that religious institutions have the right to govern free from state 
interference); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 
343, 348 (5th Cir. 1999) (agreeing with the District of Columbia Circuit’s analysis of the two strands 
of free exercise law); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460 (“[G]overnment action may burden the free 
exercise of religion . . . in two quite different ways: by interfering with a believer’s ability to observe 
the commands or practices of his faith, and by encroaching on the ability of a church to manage its 
internal affairs.” (citation omitted)). 
 34.  See supra note 33; see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.b. 
 35.  Parties have mistakenly applied precedent from the strand of free exercise law not relevant 
to the facts of their case.  See, e.g., Combs, 173 F.3d at 349 (disagreeing with the notion that Smith 
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a.  The Church Autonomy Doctrine 
The church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the Religion Clauses, provides 
that “churches have autonomy in making decisions regarding their own 
internal affairs.”36  Although some argue that church autonomy is protected 
solely by the Free Exercise Clause,37 the Supreme Court has held that the 
Establishment Clause plays an equally important role.38 
The Supreme Court first recognized a church’s right to autonomy in 
Watson v. Jones,39 a case concerning a property dispute between two church 
factions.40  The Court held that it, along with all secular courts, was bound 
by a church’s decisions in ecclesiastical matters.41  The Court recognized 
that the right to free exercise of religion came with the right to organize 
religious associations and to create independent church decision-making 
bodies.42  The secular courts could not usurp the authority of these decision-
making bodies without interfering with free exercise rights.43  The Watson 
Court also spoke of justice when declining to intervene in the dispute: 
 
and Boerne controlled the outcome of the case); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (holding that the 
burden on Free Exercise in Smith was “of a fundamentally different character” than that of the 
ministerial exception). 
 36.  Bryce, 289 F.3d at 655. 
 37.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).  
Laycock undertakes to distinguish between the two Religion Clauses, id. at 1378, something at 
which, according to Laycock, not everyone is successful.  Id. at 1379–80.  The Court talks about 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement” as the three main evils the Establishment 
Clause was designed to combat, but it is unclear from where the “inhibition” implication comes.  Id. 
at 1382 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).  Laycock describes a straightforward dichotomy where 
“Government support for religion is an element of every establishment claim, just as a burden or 
restriction on religion is an element of every free exercise claim.”  Id. at 1384. 
 38.  See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the National Labor 
Relations Board’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a parochial school constituted excessive 
entanglement with the Establishment Clause under Lemon). 
 39.  80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 40.  The Court recognized that this holding represented a sharp departure from English doctrine 
and case law but maintained that the break in tradition was acceptable—and even necessary—given 
the two countries’ profoundly differing views on the relationship between government and religion.  
Id. at 727–28. 
 41.  Id. at 727 (“[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, 
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been 
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final . . . .”). 
 42.  Id. at 728–29. 
 43.  Id.  The Court also noted that the “law . . . is committed to the support of no dogma,” 
drawing from the Establishment Clause, and the act of adjudicating disputes of this nature would 
come too close to doing exactly that.  Id. at 728. 
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Each of these large and influential bodies . . . has a body of 
constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their 
written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of 
precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a 
system of ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest 
minds to become familiar with.  It is not to be supposed that the 
judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical 
law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each 
are in reference to their own.44 
The Court interpreted both of the Religion Clauses to deny civil courts the 
right to adjudicate the church’s internal affairs, thus beginning the idea of 
church autonomy.45 
The Supreme Court had reason to revisit the church autonomy doctrine 
sixty years later in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,46 
when it held that a church has the right to determine whether a candidate for 
chaplaincy possessed the necessary characteristics to qualify for the 
position.47  The case centered on an archbishop’s refusal to appoint Gonzalez 
as chaplain, deeming him unqualified.48  Though Gonzalez’s prayer for relief 
included a demand for the chaplaincy appointment, the Court concluded that 
because this was a spiritual matter, the appointment to the chaplaincy 
ultimately was removed from the secular courts.49  The Court held thus, 
despite the fact that the controversy involved civil rights: 
Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of the 
church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a 
chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.  In the 
absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the 
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although 
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular 
 
 44.  Id. at 729. 
 45.  See id. at 728–29. 
 46.  280 U.S. 1 (1929). 
 47.  Id. at 16. 
 48.  Id. at 12–13.  Specifically, the archbishop called the boy “not legally (ecclesiastically 
speaking) capacitated to the employment of a chaplaincy.”  Id. at 13.  He was able to tie this refusal 
to solid pronouncements in canon law.  Id.  Not only were his objections codified, but the grounds 
on which he based them were incapable of bias (or pretext, see infra note 50).  For example, the 
chaplaincy required a course in theology and a minimum age of fourteen years.  Id.  Given these 
facts, it is not hard to understand why the Court did not reach the issue of a pretext question in this 
case.  See infra note 50. 
 49.  Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 11, 15–16. 
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courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by 
contract or otherwise.50 
These two cases, Watson and Gonzalez, dealt with a church’s right to 
“ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” that is, its right to have the final say in its 
internal affairs and for those decisions not to be disturbed by the civil 
courts.51  In 1952, the Supreme Court held that the Religion Clauses 
prohibited the legislature—as well as the judiciary—from interfering with 
free exercise of religion52 when it struck down a New York law as 
unconstitutional in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in North America.53  In Kedroff, the Court ruled that a New York 
statute that “passe[d] the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one 
church authority to another[,] . . . thus intrud[ing] for the benefit of one 
segment of a church . . . into the forbidden area of religious freedom” was 
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.54  
The Kedroff Court recognized the church autonomy doctrine first stated in 
Watson,55 but also acknowledged its extension of the doctrine to state law, 
given that Watson “was decided in 1872, before judicial recognition of the 
coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of 
the First Amendment against state action.”56  Thus, the power of the Religion 
Clauses to protect free exercise of religion was extended to both the states 
 
 50.  Id. at 16.  This is the first time the issue of “pretext” arose in the church autonomy context.  
See id.  In an examination of church autonomy doctrine history, the sincerity of a religious 
organization’s claims or beliefs is occasionally at issue.  See infra notes 60, 82, 90, 279, 286, 288, 
344–48.  Claiming that a decision is pretextual has become a go-to argument for opponents of 
religious organizations.  Although the facts did not implicate the pretextual question in this case, the 
Court here implied that there exists a factual scenario in which asking a pretextual question is 
appropriate.  See Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16.  However, asking whether “fraud, collusion, or 
arbitrariness” occurs (i.e., pretext) is a question that the Court recently rejected, saying it “misses the 
point of the ministerial exception.”  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012); see also infra notes 344–48 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871); Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 13. 
 52.  The Court further explained the ramifications of its Kedroff holding in Kreshik v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (“[I]t is established doctrine that ‘(i)t is not of 
moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether legislative or 
judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize.’” (quoting NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958))). 
 53.  344 U.S. 94 (1952).  The Court ruled thusly despite a push from the New York Court of 
Appeals to permit the New York legislature to rely and act on its own knowledge of Soviet religious 
attitudes.  Id. at 117. 
 54.  Id. at 119. 
 55.  See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 56.  Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115. 
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and the legislature.57 
The Kedroff decision also extended another aspect of the church 
autonomy doctrine—one perhaps more important to the ministerial 
exception—when it held that matters of church government are as 
ecclesiastical in nature as matters of faith and doctrine.58  Despite the fact 
that the dispute centered on the control of a cathedral, Justice Frankfurter 
maintained that it was not a simple real estate dispute, but that “power to 
exercise religious authority” was the “essence” of the controversy, as the 
cathedral was “the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority.”59  The Court 
said that, although Watson centered on a property dispute as well, there was 
a “spirit of freedom . . . from secular control or manipulation” and held that 
selection of clergy must fall under the church autonomy doctrine.60  
Intervention into these church governmental matters would constitute an 
unacceptable breach of constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment.61  The matter of control over the cathedral in Kedroff was 
equally ecclesiastical in nature and thus equally protected by the Religion 
Clauses.62 
From Kedroff, the Court next extended the church autonomy doctrine 
from governmental matters to administrative matters in Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich.63  The 
underlying issue in the case involved control over a diocese and its property 
and assets.64  The circuit court upheld a bishop’s defrockment, but it struck 
down a reorganization within the church as illegal and unenforceable and 
 
 57.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 58.  See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116. 
 59.  Id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Justice Frankfurter pointed out the religious nature 
of the conflict and decided that a civil court could not dispose of it without religious intervention by 
the state.  Id.  However, one could argue that his determination of the cathedral as the “center of 
ecclesiastical authority” is a religious determination, which is the thesis of Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor.  See infra text accompanying notes 236, 350–51.  This is unhelpful 
in advancing the discussion about an appropriate ministerial exception test.  See infra Part III.B. 
 60.  See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (majority opinion).  This Court, like the Gonzalez Court, 
hedged its holding: “Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, 
we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of 
religion against state interference.”  Id.; see supra text accompanying note 50.  The phrase “where 
no improper methods of choice are proven” again suggests that courts might question the underlying 
pretext of a selection—an analytical path that the Court has now confirmed is inappropriate in the 
ministerial exception context.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 344–
48 and accompanying text. 
 61.  See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 62.  See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 63.  426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 64.  Id. at 698.  Of course, the Court ultimately did not reach the issue.  Id.  Church autonomy 
cases are decided on procedural grounds (the equivalent of a subject-matter jurisdiction dismissal) 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)—under these circumstances, on the basis that the ecclesiastical courts have 
already spoken and their decisions control. 
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held that amendments to the constitution of the diocese were without force 
and effect.65  The Supreme Court held, as it now had held multiple times, 
that the lower court erred by adjudicating the dispute at all.66  A new issue in 
this case, however, was that the nature of the controversy involved 
administrative decisions incidental to the main property dispute.67  If the 
Court were to hold that the decision of the “highest judicatory”68 stood, it 
would mean that the church had exclusive control over administrative 
matters, as well as those of faith, doctrine, and governance.69  The Court held 
that, despite the civil nature of the property dispute, it was still ecclesiastical 
at its core, and, therefore, still carried the risk of excessive entanglement by 
the courts.70 
b.  Individual Free Exercise 
The second strand of Free Exercise law deals with “restrictions on an 
individual’s actions that are based on religious beliefs.”71  This line of cases 
begins primarily with Sherbert v. Verner,72 where the Court held that a 
state’s unemployment compensation eligibility policies could not restrict an 
individual’s right to exercise her religious beliefs.73  In Sherbert, a member 
 
 65.  Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708–09. 
 66.  Id. at 698 (“We hold that the inquiries made by the Illinois Supreme Court into matters of 
ecclesiastical cognizance and polity and the court’s actions pursuant thereto contravened the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 67. See id. at 709.  Because the Diocesan Bishop was the principle officer of the Diocesan 
property holdings, the outcome would decide not only the religious nature of the dispute, but also 
who controlled the property interest—an administrative matter.  Id.  The Court’s conclusion that this 
resolution was appropriate under the church autonomy doctrine is well grounded in the Gonzalez 
holding.  See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“[T]he 
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil 
rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive.” (emphasis added)). 
 68.  Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 682 (1871).  The Watson Court illustrated the 
principle of the “highest judicatory” by describing the hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church, in 
which the General Assembly amounts to the highest judicatory: from the local church to the 
presbytery, from the presbytery to the synod, and then from the synod to the General Assembly.  Id. 
at 727. 
 69.  See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 (“This principle applies with equal force to church 
disputes over church polity and church administration.”). 
 70.  See id. at 710.  The Court here made it clear that, when civil matters (such as property) and 
ecclesiastical matters overlap, the Religion Clauses’ protection extends over the entire dispute.  See 
id.  Otherwise, free exercise of religion would be jeopardized.  See id. 
 71.  Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
 72.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 73.  Id. at 401–02. 
04 ALLEN SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:19 PM 
 
656 
of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was fired from her job for refusing to 
work on the Sabbath.74  The state denied her subsequent application for 
unemployment because she did not meet the requirement under the South 
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act that she “accept available 
suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the 
employer.”75  The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled against Sherbert and 
held that the unemployment law “place[d] no restriction upon the appellant’s 
freedom of religion nor [did] it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her 
right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the 
dictates of her conscience.”76 
The Sherbert Court disagreed with the South Carolina Supreme Court’s 
holding that “appellant’s ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties,”77 
and enumerated a specific test to determine whether individual liberties are 
infringed when the regulated activities are outside the scope of state 
legislation, meaning they present no “threat to public safety, peace or 
order.”78  The Court said that: 
[T]o withstand appellant’s constitutional challenge, it must be either 
because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no 
infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free 
exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of 
appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest 
in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power 
to regulate.’79 
 
 74.  Id. at 399.  The sincerity of Sherbert’s religious beliefs was never at issue in the case, nor 
was the fact that Sabbath observance is a basic tenet of Seventh-Day Adventism.  Id. at 399 n.1. 
 75.  Id. at 400–01.  The South Carolina law required that an individual show “good cause” when 
refusing to accept work.  Id.  The state court at every level reaffirmed the conclusion that Sherbert’s 
observance of the Sabbath Day of her faith did not constitute the required “good cause.”  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 401. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See id. at 403.  Free Exercise scholars have used early state constitutions to assist in 
interpreting the Religion Clauses.  McConnell, supra note 20, at 1456.  Many of these constitutions 
contained language similar to that used by the Court in Sherbert: 
Nine of the states limited the free exercise right to actions that were “peaceable” or that 
would not disturb the “peace” or “safety” of the state.  Four of these also expressly 
disallowed acts of licentiousness or immorality; two forbade acts that would interfere 
with the religious practices of others; one forbade the “civil injury or outward disturbance 
of others”; one added acts contrary to “good order”; and one disallowed acts contrary to 
the “happiness,” as well as the peace and safety, of society. 
Id. at 1461–62 (footnotes omitted). 
 79.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).  In other 
words, the Court uses a strict scrutiny standard of review to determine which interest—the 
individual’s right of free exercise or the government’s right to burden it—trumps the other.  See id.  
It is for this reason that distinguishing between a church autonomy case and an individual free 
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In the Sherbert case, the Court held that, even though the burden was 
indirect (i.e., there were no criminal sanctions for the activity), it was 
nonetheless an invalid restriction that infringed on Sherbert’s “constitutional 
rights of free exercise.”80  The denial of benefits came directly as a result of 
her religious practice, and, because “the pressure upon her to forego that 
practice [was] unmistakable,” it was a clear burden on her right of free 
exercise.81  When the first prong of the test was met, the Court went on to 
dismiss the state’s argument that the possibility of fraudulent claims created 
a “compelling state interest” to justify the burden.82  The Court argued that, 
 
exercise case is so important.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  Strict scrutiny, first 
articulated by name in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), balances individual interests 
against government interests: 
[I]n the development of constitutional doctrine in the decades after Skinner, [it] became 
increasingly formalized into a two “prong” test now referred to as “strict scrutiny” or 
“compelling interest” analysis.  Courts first determine if the underlying governmental 
ends, or objectives, are “compelling.” . . .  [T]he Court uses compelling in the vernacular 
to describe [the] societal importance of the government’s reasons for enacting the 
challenged law.  Because the government is impinging upon someone’s core 
constitutional rights, only the most pressing circumstances can justify the government 
action. 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (fourth alteration in original) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  As Justice Scalia stated in Employment Division v. Smith, “It is 
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.”  494 
U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989)); see infra note 90.  Weighing the value of a specific creed—which would be unavoidable in 
a strict scrutiny balancing test—would violate this principle.  See infra notes 82, 279–93 and 
accompanying text. 
  When the Court determines that an individual’s right to free exercise is acceptably burdened, 
it is not placing value on one tenet over another, but instead permitting a burden on the general 
practice of religion.  The Court decided in Watson, and has since consistently held, that answering to 
civil courts for its decisions regarding internal affairs is an unacceptable burden on a religious 
organization’s free exercise.  See supra Part II.A.2.a.  Essentially, the Supreme Court already applied 
strict scrutiny to this issue, and free exercise won—the result is the church autonomy doctrine. 
 80.  See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–04.  The Court compared acts of free exercise of religion to 
acts of free speech as contemplated previously by the Court.  Id. at 404 n.5 (“Under some 
circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the 
exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.” (quoting Am. 
Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950))). 
 81.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.  Because the lower court’s decision forced her to choose between 
following her religion and working to earn a living, the burden was of the same type that a fine 
would impose.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 406–07.  The Court clarified strict scrutiny as a test requiring “only the gravest abuses” 
and made it clear that a “mere[] rational relationship to some colorable state interest would [not] 
suffice.”  Id. at 406.  The Court also declined the invitation to examine the sincerity of Sherbert’s 
beliefs—a step that the state’s argument would have required—given “the prohibition against 
judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.”  Id. at 407.  Oral arguments in Hosanna-
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even if there was a real possibility of fraud, it did not rise to the level of a 
“compelling state interest.”83  The State did not have a compelling 
governmental interest to justify the clear burden, and thus the law violated 
individual free exercise protections.84 
In 1990, the Supreme Court declined to use the Sherbert test in 
Employment Division v. Smith,85 a case that dealt with a similar 
unemployment benefits claim in the state of Oregon.86  In Smith, two 
employees were fired for peyote use in accordance with Native American 
Church practice, and their subsequent unemployment claims were denied 
because their termination was due to wrongful conduct.87  The Court held 
that Oregon was allowed to prohibit peyote use and therefore was allowed to 
deny benefits based on violation of that law.88 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the Sherbert test as 
limited in scope and “inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal 
prohibition on a particular form of conduct”89: 
 
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), focused on this 
judicial limitation and the consequences of questioning the motives of a religious institution that 
hides behind the ministerial exception.  Oral Argument at 46:30, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553.  However, the 
Court’s opinion dismissed the debate with ease, holding that the pretextual question argument 
suggests a misunderstanding of the ministerial exception.  See supra note 50; see also infra notes 
344–48 and accompanying text. 
 83.  See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.  The state’s argument suggests that allowing any and all 
individuals to refuse work on Saturday could compromise the unemployment system in the state.  Id.  
However, as the Court pointed out, the state already allowed (in express language no less) 
worshippers freedom not to work on Sunday.  Id. at 406.  To then refuse to acknowledge an 
individual’s right to the same observance on a Saturday would be clear religious discrimination.  See 
id. 
 84.  See id. at 407.  In closing, the Court was careful to narrow the opinion to South Carolina 
unemployment law relating to a religious day of rest and made it clear that this did not represent an 
act toward the establishment of a religion, but simply “nothing more than the governmental 
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.”  Id. at 409.  The Court’s refusal to give 
this ruling broad meaning makes interesting the fact that the entire body of case law regarding the 
individual strand of free exercise revolves around use of the Sherbert test.  See infra notes 80–102 
and accompanying text.  Nearly forty years later, Justice Scalia would make it clear that Sherbert 
was only ever intended for use in an unemployment compensation context and would not be 
universally applied to individual free exercise of religion.  See infra note 89. 
 85.  494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). 
 86.  See id. at 874. 
 87.  Id.  Oregon law prohibited use of controlled substances unless prescribed by a medical 
doctor.  Id.  “Controlled substance” under the Oregon law was defined in accordance with the 
classifications in Schedules I through V under federal law.  Id.  Peyote was a Schedule I drug, and 
therefore its use constituted a Class B felony.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 890. 
 89.  Id. at 884–85.  Justice Scalia rejected the Sherbert test argument and clarified its history: 
Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious 
practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.  Applying that test we 
have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that 
conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under 
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[G]overnment’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions 
of socially harmful conduct . . . “cannot depend on measuring the 
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual 
development.”  To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a 
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious 
beliefs, except where the State’s interest is “compelling”—
permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to become a law unto 
himself,”—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common 
sense.90 
He drew a distinction between prohibiting an activity because of its religious 
nature (e.g., keeping kosher) and prohibiting across the board an activity that 
happens to affect a religious practice.91  Granting an exception for peyote use 
would “relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),” creating a 
“constitutional anomaly.”92 
 
conditions forbidden by his religion.  We have never invalidated any governmental action 
on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.  
Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than 
that, we have always found the test satisfied. 
Id. at 883 (citations omitted). 
  Justice Scalia went on to list several intervening cases in which the Court declined to follow 
Sherbert.  Id. at 883–84; see, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 
(1988) (declining to apply Sherbert to government construction activities on land used by Native 
American Tribes “even though . . . the activities ‘could have devastating effects on traditional Indian 
religious practices’”); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–701 (1986) (holding that a statute requiring 
benefit applicants to provide their Social Security number was valid “regardless of whether it was 
necessary to effectuate a compelling interest”); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) 
(holding that Sherbert did not apply to regulations forbidding yarmulkes in military dress). 
 90.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (citations omitted).  Justice Scalia also foreclosed the possibility of a 
strict scrutiny trigger when the activity is “central” to the religion.  Id. at 886.  “It is not within the 
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs of practices to a faith, or the validity of 
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”  Id. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 
U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).  This form of judicial restraint is a common theme throughout this Comment, 
as courts try to avoid the pretextual question often argued by litigants in ministerial exception cases.  
See supra notes 50, 60, 82 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 279, 286, 288, 344–48. 
 91.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78.  For example, an Oregon law making the use of peyote illegal 
only in Native American Church ceremony should be unconstitutional under Justice Scalia’s 
analysis.  See id. 
 92.  See id. at 879, 886.  Justice Scalia said that it would “produce . . . a private right to ignore 
generally applicable laws.”  Id. at 886.  Justice Blackmun called the majority opinion a 
“mischaracteriz[ation] of [the] Court’s precedents” and questioned the Court’s decision that strict 
scrutiny did not apply to criminal prohibitions.  Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  The Court 
split 5–1–3 in Smith, not an overwhelming majority.  Id. at 873.  However, seven years later a 
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Three years later, in response to the Smith decision, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).93  Members of 
Congress were highly critical of the Court’s decision in Smith, and passed 
RFRA in an effort to restore and codify the Sherbert test that it deemed 
“workable.”94  Under RFRA, Congress announced: 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of 
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as 
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise 
without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith95 the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests. 
. . . . 
The purposes of this chapter are— 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner96 and Wisconsin v. Yoder97 and to guarantee its application in 
 
substantially different Court (with four new members) came down against a universally applicable 
Sherbert test again in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  See infra notes 100–07 and 
accompanying text. 
 93.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2006), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
 94.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5), (b)(1) (2006). 
 95.  494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
 96.  374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 72–84 and accompanying text. 
 97.  406 U.S. 205 (1972).  In Yoder, the Court held that First Amendment free exercise 
protections prevented the state of Wisconsin from compelling formal education up to the age of 
sixteen.  Id. at 234.  Respondents were members of the Old Order Amish religion, which opposes 
formal education after eighth grade.  Id. at 207.  The Court used in its analysis evidence that the 
Amish tenets were both legitimate and sincere (despite, apparently, what is or what is not in the 
“judicial ken,” see supra note 90), as well as evidence of the adequacy of the alternative education.  
Id. at 222.  It is one of the so-called “hybrid” cases in the Sherbert line of cases discussed in Smith.  
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars 
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all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; 
and 
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious 
exercise is substantially burdened by government.98 
RFRA, in effect, reinstated strict scrutiny as the relevant constitutional 
test as applied to federal laws as well as state laws.99 
Four years later, the Court returned fire and struck down RFRA as 
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.100  In Boerne, the Archbishop of 
San Antonio, Texas filed suit after he was denied a zoning permit to enlarge 
St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas.101  The Archbishop challenged 
the denial under RFRA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether Congress had exceeded its power in passing the law.102  Using its 
Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce due process among the States, 
Congress argued that RFRA was “appropriate legislation” under Section 
Five.103  However, the Court defined Congress’s enforcement power as the 
ability to deter and remedy.104  In other words, the legislature has the 
authority to prevent or fix constitutional violations, but not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.105  The Court found 
 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not 
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”). 
 98.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (italics added) (citations omitted). 
 99.  See id. 
 100.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 101.  Id. at 512.  The city council had recently passed a historic landmark law, under which it 
argued the church fell.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 511–12.  The district court originally concluded that Congress had exceeded its power, 
but the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that RFRA was constitutional.  Id. at 512. 
 103.  Id. at 517–18.  The Court acknowledged that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
positive grant of power: 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they 
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and 
the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is 
brought within the domain of congressional power. 
Id. (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)). 
 104.  See id. at 518; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (holding that when a 
law is a well-connected remedy or deterrent, it comes within Congress’s power even if it conflicts 
with “spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States”); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 
(1970) (upholding a ban on a literacy test voting requirement); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301 (1966) (protecting voting rights despite burden on the states). 
 105.  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
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that RFRA failed to identify any specific unconstitutional behavior needing 
deterrence or remedial action, but rather that its sweeping and broad nature 
intruded on government at every level and imposed restrictions on the states 
that the Fourteenth Amendment itself did not.106  The Court held the law 
unconstitutional because, while Congress can enforce a constitutional right, 
it exceeded its authority by changing the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause.107 
These two lines of Free Exercise cases, as well as the Establishment 
Clause Lemon test, seem to provide a comprehensive library of precedent to 
assist courts in adjudicating matters of First Amendment law relating to the 
Religion Clauses.  However, there are still American ideals—ideals just as 
fundamental as religious freedom—that conflict with the Clauses, causing 
uncertainty in Religion Clause jurisprudence.108 
B.  Anti-Discrimination Laws 
1.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)109 prohibits 
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.110  On its face, there is a natural conflict between Title VII and the 
Religion Clauses—the church autonomy doctrine specifically.  Given that 
religious organizations are often employers, the right to be free from 
employment discrimination and the right to the free exercise of religion 
cause a tension that must be resolved. 
a.  Relevant Provisions 
Several provisions of Title VII are relevant when attempting to resolve 
the tension between it and the church autonomy doctrine.  Under section 
703(a): 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 519, 532. 
 108.  See infra Part III (discussing approaches to the ministerial exception and highlighting the 
resulting problems).  In particular, though not the focus of this Comment, the reach of the ministerial 
exception to matters such as salary is unclear, see infra notes 179–82, 238 and accompanying text, as 
well as the application of the exception to different employment laws.  See infra note 177. 
 109.  Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701–718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2007–2011). 
 110.  Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.111 
Several considerations are relevant in this section.  First, it must be 
determined whether an organization is an employer under Title VII and 
whether an individual is an employee, making the definitions section 
relevant.112  Under section 701(b), an employer is “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”113  Under 
section 701(f), an employee is: 
[A]n individual employed by an employer, except that the term 
“employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in 
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters 
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s 
personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an 
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional 
or legal powers of the office.114 
If neither party falls under the employer or employee definition, the 
controversy does not fall within the provisions of Title VII.115 
The provision of Title VII perhaps most germane to the church 
autonomy discussion is found in section 702(a): 
 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  For the Title VII definitions section, see id. § 2000e. 
 113.  Id. § 2000e(b). 
 114.  Id. at § 2000e(f). 
 115.  Id. 
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This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the 
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.116 
This section exempts religious organizations that fall under the category of 
employer from the prohibition against religious discrimination.117  In other 
words, this statutory exception permits a religious organization to 
discriminate based on the individual’s religious affiliations or preferences.118 
b.  Statutory Exceptions 
It is important from the beginning to distinguish between the ministerial 
exception, which is the focus of this Comment, and the statutory exception 
codified in Title VII.  The statutory exception under section 702(a) is 
codified law passed by Congress as a built-in exception to Title VII.119  
Under section 702(a), a religious organization may discriminate based on 
religion, but only based on religion.120  For example, a religious employer 
could still be sued under Title VII for failing to hire an individual because 
she was a woman.121  In contrast, the ministerial exception is “a separate 
judge-made exception rooted in the First Amendment designed to allow 
religious organizations to hire and fire religious leaders according to any 
criteria they choose.”122  Thus, this exception would allow a religious 
organization to refuse to hire a woman because she was a woman if the court 
deemed the position ministerial.123 
 
 116.  Id. § 2000e-1(a). 
 117.  See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 121–22. 
 118.  See infra text accompanying notes 119–20. 
 119.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 120.  See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 
1985) (“While the language of § 702 makes clear that religious institutions may base relevant hiring 
decisions upon religious preferences, Title VII does not confer upon religious organizations a license 
to make those same decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.”); Douglas Laycock, A 
Syllabus of Errors, Book Survey, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1181 (2007). 
 121.  See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1181. 
 122.  EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 n.1 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (White, J., concurring), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see also infra Parts II.C, III.C 
(containing a full discussion of the ministerial exception and the Hosanna-Tabor case). 
 123.  See infra Part III.A (discussing different tests used to determine the status of minister). 
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2.  Other Discrimination Laws124 
a.  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)125 was passed in 
1990 and prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from 
discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities based on their 
disability.126  Although the ADA differs from Title VII in significant ways, 
courts have held the ADA to be a general employment discrimination law 
substantially similar to Title VII in application.127 
The ADA contains a religious exception similar to that of Title VII.128  
Under § 12113(d): 
(1) In general 
This subchapter shall not prohibit a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society from giving 
preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities. 
(2) Religious tenets requirement 
Under this subchapter, a religious organization may require that all 
applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such 
organization.129 
The legislative history shows that the ADA was not designed to broadly 
 
 124.  The following are three primary employment laws; however, the list is not exhaustive.  As 
discussed in this Comment, the ministerial exception is potentially applicable to any employment 
law. 
 125.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2007–2011). 
 126.  Id. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a). 
 127.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777 n.6 (finding no distinction between application of 
the ministerial exception to a Title VII claim and an ADA claim and also recognizing the extension 
of the exception to other employment discrimination laws); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference 
of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause barred both an ADA claim and a Title VII claim based on the ministerial exception). 
 128.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d). 
 129.  Id. 
04 ALLEN SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:19 PM 
 
666 
except religious entities.130  Similar to Title VII, the law allows the religious 
entity to discriminate based on religious affiliation alone.131 
b.  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)132 
prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from 
discriminating based on age.133  Under § 623: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with 
this chapter.134 
The ADEA applies to persons over forty years of age.135  Like Title VII and 
the ADA, the ministerial exception previously has been applied to the 
ADEA.136 
 
 130.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2 at 76–77 (1990) 
(providing the following example involving a Mormon employer: “If a person with a disability 
applies for the job, but is not a Mormon, the organization can refuse to hire him or her.  However, if 
two Mormons apply for a job, one with a disability and one without a disability, the organization 
cannot discriminate against the applicant with the disability because of that person’s disability.”). 
 131.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d); see also supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 132.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2007–2011). 
 133.  Id. § 623. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. § 631. 
 136.  See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (agreeing 
with the district court that the ADEA “does not govern disputes between a religious entity and its 
spiritual leaders”). 
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c.  The Fair Labor Standards Act 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)137 regulates conditions in 
the workplace, “protect[ing] all covered workers from substandard wages 
and oppressive working hours.”138  The FLSA applies to industries engaged 
in interstate commerce, and its purpose is to eliminate labor conditions that 
are “detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”139  The 
FLSA primarily established a minimum wage,140 set overtime at time-and-a-
half,141 and eliminated most child labor.142  The coverage of employers and 
employees as defined by the FLSA is similar to that of Title VII.143  
However, the ministerial exception to the FLSA is based on different 
grounds.144  The FLSA guidelines, as well as the floor debate, describe a 
contemplated exception within the law that supports the application of a 
ministerial exception: “Persons such as nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers, 
ministers, deacons, and other members of religious orders who serve 
pursuant to their religious obligations in schools, hospitals, and other 
institutions operated by their church or religious order shall not be 
considered to be ‘employees.’”145 
C.  The Ministerial Exception 
Between Congress’s enactment of Title VII in 1964 and the Supreme 
 
 137.  Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. IV 2007–
2011). 
 138.  Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 
206–207. 
 139.  29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 140.  Id. § 206. 
 141.  Id. § 207. 
 142.  Id. § 212. 
 143.  See supra text accompanying notes 114–16. 
 144.  See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.  It has been suggested that the FLSA should 
not have a ministerial exception.  Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 
299, 311 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that there is a ‘ministerial 
exemption’ to the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . .”). 
 145.  Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 305 (quoting WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK § 10b03 (1967)). In contrast, courts carved out the ministerial 
exception to Title VII because the statutory exception covered only discrimination based on religious 
grounds.  See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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Court’s decision in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich146 in 
1976, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated for the first time the 
ministerial exception to anti-discrimination laws in McClure v. Salvation 
Army.147  The issue before the court in McClure was whether Title VII 
applied to the employment relationship between a church and its ministers.148  
The Salvation Army dismissed McClure from her position of officer,149 for 
which she had trained for two years.150  Given that training, McClure’s status 
as a minister was not disputed.151  The Fifth Circuit was very careful to 
narrow its holding expressly to the “church-minister relationship.”152  The 
court’s unwillingness to decide the issue as relating to other church 
employees in this first ministerial exception case is telling.  Even upon first 
impression, it was clear that this would be a question laden with First 
Amendment analysis, so much so that the court was careful not to establish a 
broad rule.153 
In her suit against the Salvation Army, McClure’s prayer for relief 
called for reinstatement, an injunction against further discrimination 
practices, and compensation for the discrepancy in her pay as compared to a 
male with the same duties.154  The Salvation Army first argued that it was 
exempt from Title VII laws because it was not an employer under § 701(b) 
 
 146.  426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
 147.  460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); see Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 
772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the ministerial exception to Title VII was first 
articulated in McClure). 
 148.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 554.  Put another way, the question was whether religious freedom or 
freedom from discrimination is more important.  See Rayburn, 460 F.2d at 558 (“Only in rare 
instances where a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s 
constitutional power to regulate’ is shown can uphold state action which imposes even an ‘incidental 
burden’ on the free exercise of religion.”); see also supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 149.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.  The court substituted the word “minister” for officer, referring to 
the district court’s determination that Mrs. McClure was a minister.  Id. at 554. The district court 
reasoned, “The commanding officer of a corps acts as the ‘pastor’ of the corps, but both the corps 
commander and every other officer of the Army stationed in the locality perform the function of 
preaching to the congregation.”  McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 
1971), aff’d  460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 150.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.  McClure trained at the Salvation Army’s Officers Training 
School.  Id.  At that time, the courts had long recognized the Salvation Army as a religious 
organization.  See generally Salvation Army v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 
Bennett v. City of LaGrange, 112 S.E. 482 (Ga. 1922); Hull v. Indiana, 22 N.E. 117 (Ind. 1889). 
 151.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 556.  Because the Salvation Army was widely recognized as a 
religious organization and McClure was officially trained by that organization, her status as a 
minister was not in question.  Id.  This case did not force the court to reach the difficult question of 
who is a minister and who is not, which is the focus of this Comment.  See infra Part III. 
 152.  Id. at 555. 
 153.  Id.  Forty years later, the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Hosanna-Tabor shows that it 
was equally unwilling to establish such a rule.  See infra Part III.C (discussing in full the Court’s 
Hosanna-Tabor holding). 
 154.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 555. 
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of Title VII,155 and second that it was exempt under § 702 of Title VII156 as a 
religious employer.157  Both arguments failed.158  However, in a third 
alternative, the Salvation Army contended that the application of Title VII 
laws to the relationship between a church and its ministers violated the 
Religion Clauses.159  After a lengthy analysis, the Fifth Circuit agreed.160  It 
concluded that, though this was an employment relationship under Title VII 
definitions, it was a protected relationship under the church autonomy 
doctrine and therefore exempt161 from Title VII laws: 
 The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is 
its lifeblood.  The minister is the chief instrument by which the 
church seeks to fulfill its purpose.  Matters touching this 
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime 
ecclesiastical concern.  Just as the initial function of selecting a 
minister is a matter of church administration and government, so are 
the functions which accompany such a selection.  It is unavoidably 
true that these include the determination of a minister’s salary, his 
place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance 
of the religious mission of the church.162 
Because the selection of ministers is so central to a church’s belief system, 
the application of Title VII laws to the Salvation Army would inevitably 
result in interference by the state into matters of church doctrine, 
government, and administration.163  As the line of cases following Watson 
demonstrates, that would be an unacceptable constitutional encroachment 
 
 155.  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 113–14. 
 156.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; see also supra text accompanying notes 115–16. 
 157.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 556. 
 158.   Id. at 557–58.  The court held that the Salvation Army was an employer because it was 
engaged in “industry affecting commerce.”  Id. at 557; see supra note 114.  The court found that the 
Salvation Army was not exempt from this type of discrimination because the statutory exemption 
only covers discrimination on religious grounds.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; see supra note 117. 
 159.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 556. 
 160.  Id. at 560 (“We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment 
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister 
would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden 
to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.”). 
 161.  As opposed to being covered under a Title VII statutory exemption.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 119–23. 
 162.  McClure, 460 F.2d at 558–59. 
 163.  See id. 
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into the protections of the Religion Clauses under the church autonomy 
doctrine.164 
McClure carried the circuit courts into modern ministerial exception 
jurisprudence.165  The court successfully articulated the purpose and the 
spirit of the law by grounding the exception in Watson and its progeny, 
thereby establishing its church autonomy roots.166  It served as a starting 
point for all circuit courts to consider the application of the exception, which 
most have now done.167 
III.  APPLYING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: THE CIRCUITS IN DISARRAY 
A.  The Circuit Court Approaches168 
After McClure, other circuits followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead in 
establishing a judge-made ministerial exception that went beyond the 
statutory exception codified in Title VII.169  Though the circuits have 
universally agreed as to the existence of a ministerial exception, in 
application they have “consistently struggled to decide whether or not a 
particular employee is functionally a ‘minister.’”170 
1.  The Primary Duties Approach 
a.  The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit has applied the ministerial exception to both Title 
VII and FLSA claims.  In Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
 
 164.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 165.  See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 166.  See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See infra Part III.A.1–2 (analyzing the current circuit court approaches); see also cases cited 
infra note 168. 
 168.  The circuits discussed in this section are those with extensive or substantial ministerial 
exception case history.  However, other circuits have ruled on the exception as well.  See, e.g., 
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a former Catholic college 
chaplain was a minister); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the position of music director and organist of a religious diocese fell within the 
ministerial exception); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the church autonomy doctrine barred sexual harassment claims but finding the 
application of the ministerial exception unnecessary); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal 
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming that the ministerial exception bars claims by 
a minister against a church but without examining the scope outside of actual clergy); Natal v. 
Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 169.  See infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
 170.  Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Adventists,171 the court recognized for the first time the ministerial exception 
to Title VII and articulated a ministerial employee test, holding that a 
pastoral position was ministerial in nature despite the fact that an employee 
in that position would never be ordained.172  Having no precedent in its own 
circuit, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the 
determination “does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the 
position.”173  The court pulled language from a law review article and stated 
its rule—the “primary duties test”—thusly: “[I]f the employee’s primary 
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, 
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious 
ritual and worship, he or she should be considered ‘clergy.’”174  Though the 
court took the opportunity to articulate a rule, the evidence overwhelmingly 
supported the determination that the position was ministerial.175 
The Fourth Circuit also has applied the ministerial exception to FLSA 
claims,176 and although the court has acknowledged that the ministerial 
exception to Title VII is based on constitutional principles rather than 
congressional ones, it has held “that the ministerial exceptions under the two 
Acts are coextensive in scope.”177  Thus, the court applied the same primary 
 
 171.  772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 172.  Id. at 1168–69. 
 173.  Id. (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 174.  Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the 
Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 
1545 (1979)). 
 175.  Id.  The holding was probably prompted by the fact, specific to this case, that the position 
was one that could never be ordained under Seventh-Day Adventist doctrine.  Id.  This required the 
court to clarify that ordination was not necessary for ministerial exception application.  See id.  
Without that fact, precedent indicates that the position would have fallen squarely within the 
exception.  See supra note 168. 
  The court later applied its primary duties test in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000).  There, a choir director filed discrimination claims under Title 
VII, and the court found her to be a ministerial employee because “the positions [were] ‘important to 
the spiritual and pastoral mission’ of the church.”  Id. at 802.  The Fifth Circuit also classified a 
music director as ministerial.  See infra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. 
 176.  Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Dole v. 
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 177.  Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306.  The FLSA contains a codified exception upon which the 
ministerial exception is based, making it substantially different from the Title VII exception.  See 
supra note 145 and accompanying text.  The purposes of the statutes are also quite different.  The 
full text of congressional findings for the FLSA states: 
(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of 
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being 
of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to 
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duties test for each.178  The court applied the test in Dole v. Shenandoah 
Baptist Church,179 where a school operated by a Baptist church opposed a 
suit for teacher back pay under the FLSA.180  The court determined that the 
pay issues “[did] not cut to the heart of Shenandoah beliefs,” and therefore 
that the church’s right of free exercise was not burdened.181  Though 
Shenandoah argued that the teachers were no different from the plaintiff in 
Rayburn, the court held that to give the exception this “sweeping 
interpretation” because the teachers were members of the faith “would 
‘create an exception capable of swallowing up the rule.’”182 
More recently, the court applied the ministerial exception to the FLSA 
in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc.183  It held that 
a kosher supervisor’s FLSA overtime wages claim was barred by the 
ministerial exception when it found his position to be primarily religious.184  
Although his main duties consisted of supervising the delivery, inspection, 
and preparation of food, his primary responsibility was protecting against 
violations of Jewish dietary law, which the court found to be central to 
Jewish canon.185  Shaliehsabou also presented himself as clergy on his 
federal tax returns, a fact that the court deemed to weigh heavily in favor of 
a ministerial finding.186  Thus, Shaliehsabou was a minister because his 
 
be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several 
States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an 
unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and 
obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with 
the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.  That Congress further finds that 
the employment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce. 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a)–219 (2006).  The language justifies 
the exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but it might also be possible to 
read into it a goal of protecting peace and safety among citizens.  If so read, there is a strong 
argument that FLSA does not support the application of a ministerial exception.  When drafting the 
Religion Clauses, the Framers took substantial language from existing state constitutions.  See supra 
note 21 and accompanying text.  Most of these early constitutions made it clear that peace and safety 
of citizens trumped free exercise of religion.  See supra note 78.  This question, however, is outside 
the scope of this Comment. 
 178.  Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306; see also supra text accompanying note 174. 
 179.  899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 180.  Id. at 1391.  The suit was initiated by the federal government.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 1397.  The court examined the Shenandoah doctrine through passages in the Bible and 
questioning of witnesses.  Id.  This seems at best a questionable approach, given the Supreme 
Court’s long-standing refusal to evaluate religious doctrine.  See supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90 and 
accompanying text; see also infra notes 279, 286, 288, 344–48 and accompanying text. 
 182.  Dole, 899 F.2d at 1397. 
 183.  363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 184.  Id. at 309. 
 185.  Id. at 303. 
 186.  Id. at 308.  In extending the ministerial exception as far as to hold that a food supervisor was 
a minister, the court relied on its Raleigh holding to show that secular duties can be part of a 
primarily religious position.  Id.; see also supra note 175.  Here again is an example of the court 
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primary duties were in furtherance of the Jewish faith and its mission.187 
b.  The District of Columbia Circuit 
In 1996, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the primary duties test 
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America.188  There, a nun filed claims 
under Title VII after the Catholic university where she taught denied her 
tenure.189  Relying on Fourth Circuit conclusions in Rayburn, the court held 
that “the ministerial exception encompasses all employees of a religious 
institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary functions serve its 
spiritual and pastoral mission.”190  The precepts of the tenure position were 
well-established by Catholic canon, stating the mission as “foster[ing] and 
teach[ing] sacred doctrine and the disciplines related to it.”191  The court 
found that the primary duties of the position were religious in nature, and 
thus the employment decision fell under the ministerial exception.192 
The court addressed another important question in Catholic University 
when it held that the ministerial exception survived the Supreme Court’s 
Smith decision.193  The Smith Court held, in relevant part, that “the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with 
a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes . . . .”194  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that because Title 
VII was a “neutral law,” the ministerial exception could not stand.195  The 
court disagreed, distinguishing a religious institution from an individual with 
regard to the protections Justice Scalia clarified in Smith.196  In doing so, the 
 
wading into the waters of religious interpretation by determining the importance of dietary law in the 
Jewish faith.  See supra notes 82, 90 and accompanying text. 
 187.  Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 309. 
 188.  83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  This circuit previously applied the ministerial exception in 
Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  
There, the plaintiff was an ordained minister—thus his ministerial status was not at issue.  Catholic 
Univ., 83 F.3d at 463. 
 189.  Id. at 457. 
 190.  Id. at 463.  This language is similar to that of the Fourth Circuit.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 174–75. 
 191.  Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 463–64. 
 192.  Id. at 465. 
 193.  Id. at 462. 
 194.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (internal quotations omitted); see discussion 
supra notes 85–92; see also infra notes 212–19 and accompanying text. 
 195.  Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461–62. 
 196.  Id. at 462. 
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court pointed to the strand of free exercise law dealing with church 
autonomy, rather than the strand dealing with individual free exercise.197  
Acknowledging that these are two separate concepts, the court concluded 
that the ministerial exception relies on the premise in which church 
autonomy is rooted: the “fundamental right of churches to ‘decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as 
well as those of faith and doctrine.’”198  Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that the 
Smith holding did not disturb the ministerial exception.199 
c.  The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit most recently applied the ministerial exception in 
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School,200 where 
it used the primary duties test to determine that a teacher at Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (Hosanna-Tabor) was not a 
minister for purposes of the exception.201  The plaintiff, Cheryl Perich 
(Perich), filed ADA claims for discrimination and retaliation after the school 
removed her from her teaching position due to her disability and 
subsequently terminated her employment in retaliation against her threat of 
legal action.202  The school classified teachers as either “contract” or 
“called.”203  Called teachers were required to take classes in the Lutheran 
faith and subsequently given the title of “commissioned minister.”204  Perich 
served as a contract teacher for a short time before becoming a called 
teacher.205  The district court dismissed the claims, holding that they fell 
under the ministerial exception.206 
 
 197.  See id.; supra Part II.A.2. 
 198.  Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian 
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 199.  See id. at 463. 
 200.  597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).  The Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari and reversal of the Sixth Circuit on January 11, 2012 is the focus of this Comment.  See 
infra Part III.C. 
 201.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 782.  The Sixth Circuit first adopted the primary duties test in 
Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007), where it held that ADA claims 
brought by a resident in a Methodist hospital’s pastoral education program were barred by the 
ministerial exception.  Id. at 227.  In Hollins, the court quoted language from the Fourth Circuit, see 
supra text accompanying note 174, and followed its lead in adopting the primary duties test.  
Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226.  However, the dispositive issue in the case was whether the hospital could 
and did waive that exception.  Id.  Thus, while it adopted the ministerial exception, the Hollins court 
did not apply the primary duties test to the facts of the case.  Id. 
 202.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774–75.  The facts of the case are discussed in further detail in 
the analysis of the Supreme Court opinion.  See infra Part III.C.1. 
 203.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 772. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 206.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 775. 
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the primary duties test to Perich’s 
position.207  Following its Hollins precedent,208 the court stated: 
 To determine whether an employee is ministerial . . . this Circuit 
has instructed courts to look at the function, or “primary duties” of 
the employee.  As a general rule, an employee is considered a 
minister if “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, 
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious 
order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and 
worship.”209 
The court found that Perich’s main function was not religious for various 
reasons, including the fact that an overwhelming percentage of her day was 
spent teaching secular subjects; the fact that, though she had the title of 
minister, other employees in her position were not required to be ministers 
or members of the Lutheran Church; and the fact that her position as a 
religious “role model” did not convert her teaching duties into religious 
activities.210  Thus, Perich was not a minister for the purposes of the 
exception.211 
2.  Other Approaches 
a.  The Fifth Circuit 
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit ruled on two important ministerial exception 
cases.  First, in Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United 
Methodist Church,212 the court held that the ministerial exception survived 
the Supreme Court’s Smith decision.213  Combs, a female reverend, filed sex 
and pregnancy discrimination claims under Title VII and argued that the 
 
 207.  Id. at 778–82. 
 208.  See supra note 201. 
 209.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); see also supra note 
174 and accompanying text. 
 210.  Id. at 780.  Prior to its analysis, the court pointed out that the circuits have generally held 
parochial teachers not to be ministerial employees, id. at 778–79, citing Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1991), and EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th 
Cir. 1986), as examples.  See infra Parts III.A.1.a, III.A.2.c. 
 211.  Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 780–81. 
 212.  173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 213.  Id. at 349; see supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text. 
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ministerial exception should not apply in light of Smith.214  Combs reasoned 
that the church should not be exempt from sex discrimination laws because 
they are “facially neutral,”215 and the Smith Court held that the Free Exercise 
Clause did not exempt compliance with a “neutral law of general 
applicability.”216 
The court rejected this argument and agreed with the District of 
Columbia Circuit’s analysis of the question.217  The court focused on the 
distinction between the two strands of free exercise law and concluded that 
Smith definitively was a product of the individual strand of free exercise.218  
Thus, Smith was distinguishable from Combs, and the ministerial exception 
remained alive and well.219 
Shortly after the Combs decision, the Fifth Circuit faced another 
ministerial exception question in Starkman v. Evans,220 where it delineated 
its version of the ministerial employee test.221  In Starkman, a choir director 
brought discrimination claims under the ADA, and the court concluded that 
she was a ministerial employee based on a three-part test: 
First, this court must consider whether employment decisions 
regarding the position at issue are made “largely on religious 
criteria.”. . .   
 Second, to constitute a minister for purposes of the “ministerial 
exception,” the court must consider whether the plaintiff was 
qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the 
Church. . . . 
 Third, and probably most important, is whether [the employee] 
“engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or 
religious,” including whether the plaintiff “attends to the religious 
needs of the faithful.”222 
 
 214.  Combs, 173 F.3d at 347. 
 215.  Id. at 348. 
 216.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also discussion supra notes 85–92 and 
accompanying text. 
 217.  Combs, 173 F.3d at 349; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 218.  Combs, 173 F.3d at 349. 
 219.  For a more extensive analysis of the ministerial exception after Smith and Boerne, see 
discussion supra Part III.A.1.b.  Because the questions were almost identical, the Combs court 
heavily relied on the analysis of the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Catholic 
University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  Combs, 173 F.3d at 348–49. 
 220.  198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 221.  Id. at 176. 
 222.  Id. (citations omitted).  The court pulled each of these criterion from an earlier Fifth Circuit 
case, EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981), the 
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The court determined that the employment decision was based on religious 
criteria because religious music was important to the “spiritual mission of 
the church;” that Starkman was authorized to perform ceremonies because 
she had several religious duties; and that she attended the needs of the 
faithful as a “ministerial presence.”223  Thus, Starkman was a ministerial 
employee for purposes of the exception, and the Fifth Circuit adopted a clear 
and cogent ministerial exception test.224 
b.  The Second Circuit 
In 2008, the Second Circuit confirmed for the first time the existence of 
a ministerial exception in Rweyemamu v. Cote,225 where it held that the 
exception barred an African-American Catholic priest’s racial discrimination 
claim under Title VII.226  When the Diocese promoted a white man to parish 
administrator over Rweyemamu, he filed racial discrimination claims with 
the EEOC and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities (CHRO).227  The CHRO dismissed the claim on ministerial 
exception grounds, and Rweyemamu subsequently was fired from his 
position with the Diocese.228  Because Rweyemamu’s position as priest fell 
squarely within the ministerial exception as articulated in McClure,229 the 
court had no occasion to examine the scope of the exception as applied to 
“lay employees.”230  It did, however, express its view on the matter in dicta: 
 
first to consider employees outside the clergy for purposes of the ministerial exception.  In that case, 
the church’s dispute was with the EEOC itself, and the court had to decide whether the seminary in 
its entirety was subject to EEOC regulations.  Id. at 279.  Although it was in Southwestern Baptist 
that the court first articulated the test, the circumstances surrounding its application were atypical.  
Id.  The question was whether a religious institution was exempt from EEOC regulations, not 
whether an employee was ministerial and therefore denied protection under anti-discrimination laws.  
Id.  Thus, it was important for the court in Starkman to reiterate the test under model ministerial 
exception circumstances. 
 223.  Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176. 
 224.  Id. at 177.  The Fourth Circuit has also held that a music-related position was ministerial.  
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); see discussion supra 
note 175. 
 225.  520 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 226.  Id. at 209. 
 227.  Id. at 200.  The Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities is Connecticut’s 
equivalent to the EEOC.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); see supra Part II.C (discussing 
the first application of the ministerial exception in McClure). 
 230.  Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208–09. (“We need not attempt to delineate the boundaries of the 
ministerial exception here, as we find that Father Justinian’s Title VII claim easily falls within 
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 Circuit courts applying the ministerial exception have 
consistently struggled to decide whether or not a particular 
employee is functionally a “minister.”  While we agree that courts 
should consider the “function” of an employee, rather than his title 
or the fact of his ordination, we still find this approach too rigid as it 
fails to consider the nature of the dispute. . . . [A] lay employee’s 
relationship to his employer may be “so pervasively religious” that 
judicial interference in the form of a discrimination inquiry could 
run afoul of the Constitution.231 
This approach acknowledged the difficulty in creating a blanket rule to 
determine which employees fall within the scope of the ministerial exception 
and essentially advocated an ad hoc test, given that the nature of an 
employee’s duties should be weighed differently according to context.232 
c.  The Ninth Circuit 
In March of 2010, in Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop 
of Seattle,233 a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit adopted a ministerial 
employee test similar to the Fifth Circuit’s test.234  In December 2010, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated en banc the portion of the opinion that announced that 
test.235  In the first case, Alcazar, a seminarian, filed an overtime wages 
claim under the state of Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (Act).236  The 
 
them.”).  The Second Circuit used the term “lay employee” as distinguished from “religious 
employee” to indicate an employee who is not a member of the clergy and therefore is subject to the 
functionality test.  Id.  Given the confusion over what test to use and how to apply it, the term is 
more suitable than “secular” or “non-religious,” as the “laity” is defined as “the body of religious 
worshipers, as distinguished from the clergy.”  Laity Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/laity (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 231.  Id. at 208 (citations omitted). 
 232.  See supra text accompanying note 170.  The Second, like most circuits, agreed that the 
ministerial exception would not apply to tort liability or breach of contract claims.  See Rweyemamu, 
520 F.3d at 208 (“The minister struck on the head by a falling gargoyle as he is about to enter the 
church may have an actionable claim.”). 
 233.  598 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated in part, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 234.  See supra text accompanying note 222. 
 235.  Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc).  Although vacated in the Ninth Circuit, due to its sensible nature and usefulness in 
displaying the shortcomings of the primary duties test, this Comment chooses not to vacate this test.  
It will be discussed in detail. 
 236.  Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 671.  Application of the ministerial exception to suits filed under this 
law is most analogous to that of the FLSA claims out of the Fourth Circuit.  See supra notes 176–87 
and accompanying text.  However, the Ninth Circuit never seriously questioned the exception’s 
applicability; on the contrary, it concluded broadly that application of the Act to the church-minister 
relationship would result in entanglement.  Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 672–73 (“[T]he very process of civil 
court inquiry into the clergy-church relationship can be sufficient entanglement.”); see also 
discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
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court rejected Alcazar’s argument that “the decision whether to pay him 
overtime wages ‘is not the sort of religious practice the First Amendment 
shields from secular examination.’”237  Instead, the court pointed to Ninth 
Circuit precedent that included the determination of a minister’s salary as 
part of ministerial decisions that fall within the ministerial exception.238 
As a seminarian training to become a priest, Alcazar fell squarely within 
the church-minister relationship.239  Nonetheless, Alcazar next argued for the 
application of the primary duties test used by the Fourth and District of 
Columbia Circuits, because, at that point in his training, he primarily 
performed maintenance duties for the church; thus his primary duties were 
not religious.240  The court also rejected this argument and declined to adopt 
the primary duties test: 
 
 Instead, we adopt a test similar to the Fifth Circuit’s and hold 
that if a person (1) is employed by a religious institution, (2) was 
chosen for the position based “largely on religious criteria,” and (3) 
performs some religious duties and responsibilities, that person is a 
“minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception.241 
 
Alcazar was attending a pastoral ministry on his way to becoming an 
ordained priest.242  According to the court, the primary duties test has an 
 
 237.  Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 674. 
 238.  Id. (“Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church administration 
and government, so are the functions which accompany such a selection[, including] the 
determination of a minister’s salary . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province 
of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999)).  In Bollard, the court held that a sexual 
harassment claim did not fall within the ministerial exception, as it did not relate to the selection of 
clergy.  Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950.  In Alcazar, the classification of the salary decision under the 
ministerial exception accurately reflects the spirit of the ministerial exception.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 159–66.  However, the more appropriate context for this argument would be a 
suit for unfair wages or wage discrimination based on race or sex.  See McClure v. Salvation Army, 
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the Salvation Army was exempt from a discrimination 
claim based on sex); see also supra notes 146–64 and accompanying text.  A claim for overtime 
wages is more akin to the peace and safety concerns of the FLSA.  See supra note 177. 
 239.  Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1290.  When this is the case, no determination of functionality is 
required.  See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 240.  Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 675.  This argument exposes a major flaw in the primary duties test that 
the court subsequently addressed.  Id. at 675–76; see infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.  It 
makes the vacation en banc unfortunate, given that it was the best articulation of the argument 
against the test.  See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the problems with the primary duties test). 
 241.  Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 676. 
 242.  Id. at 670.  This also adds to circuits’ agreement that actual ordination is not required.  See 
supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.  There should be no difference between training for 
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“arbitrary 51% requirement”243 that would result in the conclusion that 
Alcazar was not a ministerial employee, regardless of the fact that he was in 
the middle of the ordination process.244  By examining the number of hours 
dedicated to religious tasks, the overall spirit of the position may be missed, 
and the integrity of the exception compromised.245  This test, the court 
argued, recognizes that a ministerial employee’s job—including that of 
actual clergy to whom the exception undoubtedly applies—may require the 
performance of secular duties.246 
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc expressly to vacate this 
test.247  The court determined that, because Alcazar’s employment fell easily 
within the ministerial exception, the court’s delineation of a ministerial 
employee test constituted unnecessary overreaching.248  The court 
acknowledged that both parties and amici wanted a “test of general 
applicability” regarding the ministerial exception, but the court declined to 
adopt either another circuit’s test or the one proposed by its own three-judge 
panel.249 
Before Alcazar, the Ninth Circuit considered the ministerial exception in 
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n,250 and later in EEOC v. Fremont 
Christian School.251  In Pacific Press, the employee was an editorial 
secretary at a religious publishing house.252  In Fremont, the employees were 
teachers at a Christian school.253  While it held that the ministerial exception 
did not apply, the court did not use the primary duties test.254  Instead, the 
court in both cases focused its analysis on whether the discrimination claim 
in question affected the religious beliefs of the church and whether the 
 
ordination and being ordained; both are equally ministerial for legal purposes.  See supra notes 160–
67 and accompanying text. 
 243.  Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 676.  The court also made the point that this type of inquiry may 
constitute excessive entanglement and thus may violate the Establishment Clause as well.  Id. at 675; 
see supra Part II.A.1; see also infra Parts III.B.2, III.C.3. 
 244.  Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292 (“We hold that the First Amendment considerations relevant to an 
ordained minister apply equally to a person who, though not yet ordained, has entered into a church-
recognized seminary program to become a minister and who brings suit concerning employment 
decisions arising from work as a seminarian.”). 
 245.  See supra notes 160–67 and accompanying text. 
 246.  Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 676. 
 247.  Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1290. 
 248.  Id. at 1290–91 (“The paradigmatic application of the ministerial exception is to the 
employment of an ordained minister which, in cases involving Roman Catholicism, would include 
priests.”). 
 249.  Id. at 1290–92. 
 250.  676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 251.  781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 252.  676 F.2d at 1275. 
 253.  781 F.2d at 1364. 
 254.  Id. at 1370. 
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state’s interest in preventing the discrimination outweighed the resulting 
burden on free exercise.255  The court did not analyze the function of either 
position, but summarily concluded that neither was ministerial in nature.256  
Thus, precedent required the court to adopt a ministerial employee test much 
later in Alcazar, as it had not articulated one before.257 
B.  The Problems with Ministerial Exception Jurisprudence (Sorting Out the 
Mess) 
Since McClure, the circuit courts have accepted universally the 
ministerial exception as applied to the quintessential “minister.”258  When the 
nature of the position in question falls so comfortably within the definition 
of minister as to indicate unambiguously the need for church autonomy, all 
the circuits agree that the Religion Clauses mandate an exception.259  
However, when the facts require courts to examine the outer boundaries of 
the exception, hardly any of them agree.260  Indeed, at times the circuits have 
even contradicted their own precedent.261 
1.  The Primary Duties Test (The Inconsistency Problem) 
As the Ninth Circuit demonstrated, the facts of Alcazar effectively 
highlight the problems with the primary duties test.262  The Supreme Court 
 
 255.  Id. at 1368.  This is essentially the Sherbert test, which is rooted in the individual free 
exercise strand of law, rather than the church autonomy strand of law, under which the ministerial 
exception falls.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2.  In Alcazar, the court (correctly) did not examine 
the burden on the church, but rather concluded that autonomy controlled regardless of the burden, 
creating inconsistent precedent in the Ninth Circuit.  See supra Parts II.A.2.b, III.A.2.c; see also 
discussion supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 256.  Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1370. 
 257.  See supra notes 240–41.  It is surprising that the court found no opportunity to articulate a 
ministerial employee test before Alcazar, given that both Pacific Press and Fremont involved the 
application of the ministerial exception to employees of a religious institution outside the clergy.  
See supra text accompanying notes 252–53. 
 258.  As Justice Alito pointed out in his Hosanna-Tabor concurrence, the term minister can be 
misleading and should be used only as a term of art.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  Because the United States plays 
host to almost every religion in the world, creating a standard around ordination or the term 
“minister” would create a prejudice against many religious organizations to which the exception 
absolutely applies.  Id. 
 259.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 260.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 261.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2.c; see also supra note 255. 
 262.  See supra notes 233–49 and accompanying text. 
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decided that the Sixth Circuit, in a perfectly rational application of the test, 
came to the wrong conclusion.263  The main problem with the primary duties 
test is the inconsistent results it produces. 
The circuit courts applied the primary duties test to teachers in Catholic 
University, Dole, and Hosanna-Tabor.264  When the District of Columbia 
Circuit applied the test to a teacher in Catholic University, it held that the 
position “clearly fit[] the description” of minister under the primary duties 
test.265  In Dole, the Fourth Circuit applied the ministerial exception to a 
group of teachers and decided their positions were not ministerial in 
function.266  The teachers taught at a Baptist school that adhered to Baptist 
values and doctrine, but, unlike the District of Columbia Circuit in Catholic 
University, the Fourth Circuit held that they were not ministers.267 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Sixth Circuit held that the “called” teachers at 
the school were not ministers even though they were ordained by the 
Lutheran Church, taught religious subjects, and were charged with 
promoting Lutheran beliefs.268  The court ignored the fact that the church 
considered Perich to be an ordained minister and dissected the hours in her 
day to determine that her secular duties defined her teaching position more 
than her religious duties; it thus concluded that she was not a minister.269  As 
the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Alcazar, however, the number of secular 
duties or the time spent performing them often has nothing to do with how 
religious a position may or may not be.270  The disparity created in these 
cases by the application of the same test is disconcerting.  Catholic 
University, Dole, and Hosanna-Tabor each applied the same test to 
essentially the same position—teaching—and came to different 
conclusions.271  These cases alone demonstrate the lack of reliability in 
applying the primary duties test. 
In other instances, the primary duties of the position have been clearly 
more secular than religious, and yet courts still inexplicably (and yet 
 
 263.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 264.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 265.  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 266.  Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The teachers in 
the present case perform no sacerdotal functions; neither do they serve as church governors.”); see 
also supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. 
 267.  Supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 268.  See supra Part III.A.1.c. 
 269.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c.  The Supreme Court specifically disagreed with the 
court’s choice not to consider Perich’s ministerial title.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 698 (2012).  Not only was the title not dispositive, but 
according to the Sixth Circuit, it was barely probative.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 270.  See supra notes 233–49 and accompanying text. 
 271.  See supra notes 179–82, 188–99, 200–11 and accompanying text. 
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correctly, if the spirit of the exception is the yardstick272) have held the 
positions to be ministerial.273  In Shaliehsabou, the employee was a kosher 
supervisor in charge of inspecting food.274  It would be very hard to argue 
that inspecting food is more of a religious duty than teaching a religious 
subject (which Perich did at Hosanna-Tabor).275  However, that is exactly 
how the two decisions came out.276  The Fourth Circuit held that the food 
inspector position was ministerial, while the Sixth Circuit held that the 
teaching position was not.277  Because the Fourth Circuit in Shaliehsabou in 
actuality looked at the purpose of the exception and the fact that the position 
was “pervasively religious,”278 it came out the right way.  However, the right 
conclusion was a fluke.  The continued use of the primary duties test will 
create more inconsistent results like those of Shaliehsabou, Hosanna-Tabor, 
Dole, and Catholic University. 
2.  Strict Scrutiny (The Entanglement Problem) 
On more than one occasion the circuits have come dangerously close to 
“question[ing] the centrality of particular beliefs,” a practice, known as 
asking the “pretextual question,” consistently eschewed by the Supreme 
Court.279  One might even argue that they have done it outright.  In Pacific 
Press and Fremont, the Ninth Circuit not only failed to apply any ministerial 
employee test to the positions in question, but it also specifically analyzed 
the centrality of the churches’ beliefs to determine that its beliefs and 
doctrine were not threatened.280  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit in Dole 
determined that the question of whether to compensate heads of household 
differently did not “cut to the heart of Shenandoah’s beliefs.”281 
 
 272.  See supra notes 159–66 and accompanying text. 
 273.  See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 274.  See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 275.  See supra Part III.A.1.c. 
 276.  See supra notes 183–87, 200–11 and accompanying text. 
 277.  See supra notes 183–87, 200–11 and accompanying text. 
 278.  Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 279.  Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); see also supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90 and 
accompanying text; see also infra notes 286, 288, 344–48 and accompanying text. 
 280.  See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying text; see also Bollard v. Cal. Province of the 
Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the Sherbert balancing test to determine 
whether the application of Title VII violates the Free Exercise Clause). 
 281.  Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397 (4th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 
179–81 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, all three cases rejected the ministerial 
exception.282  The Sixth Circuit did not interpret church doctrine in Hosanna-
Tabor, but in Alcazar, the Ninth Circuit posited that “the very process of 
civil court inquiry into the clergy-church relationship can be sufficient 
entanglement.”283  The main problem in these cases is the application of 
strict scrutiny, a standard of review that requires balancing the state’s 
interest against the burden on free exercise.284  This is a process that, when 
applied to a religious organization rather than an individual, by definition 
calls for inquiry into the value and importance of any number of religious 
tenets.285  For this reason, Religion Clause history shows strict scrutiny as 
applicable to the individual free exercise line of cases, not the church 
autonomy line of cases.286  The ministerial exception is based in the latter.287  
In Pacific Press, the court looked for a compelling state interest to justify the 
burden on the publishing house’s free exercise and found that the state 
interest heavily outweighed the burden because there was no burden at all: 
Preventing discrimination can have no significant impact upon the 
exercise of Adventist beliefs because the Church proclaims that it 
does not believe in discriminating against women or minority 
groups, and that its policy is to pay wages without discrimination on 
the basis of race, religion, sex, age, or national origin.  Thus, 
enforcement of Title VII’s equal pay provision does not and could 
not conflict with Adventist religious doctrines, nor does it prohibit 
an activity “rooted in religious belief.”288 
 
 282.  See supra notes 179–82, 250–57 and accompanying text. 
 283.  Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668, 672, 672–73 (9th Cir. 
2010); see supra note 236; see also infra Part III.C.3. 
 284.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 285.  See supra notes 90, 183–87 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 288–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 286.  See supra Part II.A.2, III.A.1.b.  Because of the required balancing of interests involved in 
the application of strict scrutiny, this is not a standard of review that can avoid the pretextual 
question if applied carefully.  Strict scrutiny balancing violates the goal of the ministerial exception 
on its face.  See infra note 288. 
 287.  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]hile it is true that 
some of the cases that have invoked the ministerial exception have cited the compelling interest test, 
all of them rely on a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches 
to ‘decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those 
of faith and doctrine.’” (citation omitted)).  It should be noted that citing a test and using it are two 
different things.  In this instance, the court cited McClure, which was quoting the Sherbert test.  See 
also supra Part II.A.2. 
 288.  EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982).  The court in 
Fremont heavily relied on Pacific Press to come to essentially the same conclusion.  See supra notes 
250–57 and accompanying text.  The Court’s conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor regarding the pretextual 
question directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning: 
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The court did not examine the duties of the female employee, as would have 
been typical in a ministerial exception case, but instead delved into the 
substance of Seventh-Day Adventist beliefs to conclude for them that their 
doctrine would not be affected—this is the precise type of question that the 
judiciary has no authority to determine.289  Autonomy does not question 
whether activity “rooted in religious belief” is “prohibit[ed],” but whether 
that activity is examined at all.290  It is not up to the courts to decide what 
action does or does not comport with religious doctrine.291  It has been long 
recognized in the area of church autonomy that strict scrutiny (or any 
standard of judicial review) has no place when there are some free exercise 
interests that trump any state interest, compelling or otherwise.292  As the 
Ninth Circuit has said, “Some religious interests under the Free Exercise 
Clause are so strong that no compelling state interest justifies government 
intrusion into the ecclesiastical sphere.”293 
Simply put, there is nothing reliable about ministerial exception 
jurisprudence in the circuit courts.  Tests are applied and precedent 
interpreted so unpredictably as to warrant an explanation from the Supreme 
Court.  When the Court granted certiorari on March 28, 2011, and agreed to 
hear Hosanna-Tabor, it seemed as though one was coming.294 
 
That . . . misses the point of the ministerial exception.  The purpose of the exception is 
not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious 
reason.  The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will 
minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—is the church’s alone. 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012) (citation 
omitted). 
 289.  Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279; see also supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90, 279, 286 and 
accompanying text.  In fact, the result of this case was probably accurate.  Had the court applied any 
of the ministerial employee tests, the employee should have been found not to be ministerial.  See 
discussion supra III.A.1, III.A.2.a–b.  But the fact that the court could have come to the right result 
using proper analysis makes it all the more inexcusable that it applied the wrong test. 
 290.  See supra text accompanying note 288. 
 291.  See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 
1985) (“[W]e may not then inquire whether the reason for Rayburn’s rejection had some explicit 
grounding in theological belief.”). 
 292.  See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 293.  Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 294.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) 
(mem.). 
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C.  The Supreme Court (Almost) Speaks: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC 
On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court confirmed, in a quick 9–0 
decision, the existence of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.295  Although it reversed 
the Sixth Circuit by holding that Perich was a ministerial employee,296 the 
Court upheld over forty years of circuit law by adopting the exception.297  
However, it did little more than that.  Chief Justice Roberts announced the 
opinion of the Court, which unanimously held that there was a ministerial 
exception and that it did apply to Perich.298  However, the decision was silent 
on many issues the circuits have debated amongst themselves since the 
McClure court first articulated the exception in 1971.299  The narrow holding 
failed to clarify any number of issues raised by the circuit courts over the 
years, and the questions that surround the ministerial exception went 
unanswered. 
1.  Facts of the Case 
In 1999, Perich began her employment relationship with Hosanna-Tabor 
as a “lay teacher.”300  Hosanna-Tabor, a member of the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, operates a small school where students can receive a 
“Christ-centered education” and employs “lay” and “called” teachers.301  Lay 
teachers (also called “contract” teachers) do not require any particular 
training and are only hired when called teachers are unavailable.302  “Called” 
teacher requirements include substantial theological study, as well as 
endorsement by the teacher’s Synod.303  Hosanna-Tabor employed Perich as 
a lay teacher for only a short time until she obtained her diploma of 
vocation, designating her a commissioned minister, and she became a called 
teacher.304  In addition to various secular subjects such as math and science, 
Perich taught a religion class four days a week.305  She also led organized 
prayers, and both attended and occasionally led the weekly school-wide 
 
 295.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 296.  Id. at 707. 
 297.  See supra Parts II.C, III.A (discussing the circuit court ministerial exception cases). 
 298.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 299.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
 300.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700. 
 301.  Id. at 699. 
 302.  Id. at 699–700. 
 303.  Id. at 699. 
 304.  Id. at 700. 
 305.  Id. 
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chapel service.306 
In June 2004, Perich developed narcolepsy and went on disability leave 
before the start of the 2004–2005 school year.307  In January 2005, Perich 
notified the school that she was able to return to work.308  However, the 
principal informed her that the school had filled her position for the 
remainder of the school year.309  The school not only replaced Perich but also 
questioned her fitness to be around students in the classroom and doubted 
that she would be able to return to work at all.310  The administration asked 
her to “peaceful[ly]” resign her call and Perich refused, producing a note 
from her physician that indicated her ability to return to work.311  When 
Perich presented herself for work, the principal asked her to leave, which she 
did only after obtaining written documentation of her appearance.312  When 
the principal later told Perich that she likely would be fired, Perich 
threatened legal action.313  The school board met and decided to rescind 
Perich’s call; she was sent a letter of termination in April.314 
Perich, together with the EEOC, brought claims against Hosanna-Tabor 
for unlawful retaliation, and she sought both reinstatement and damages.315  
The school moved for summary judgment, citing the ministerial exception as 
a bar to Perich’s claims.316  The district court granted Hosanna-Tabor’s 
motion, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that Perich’s 
position was not ministerial.317 
2.  Chief Justice Roberts Delivers the Opinion of the Court 
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts first established that the 
question presented was “whether the Establishment and Free Exercise 
 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Id. 
 312.  Id. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Id. at 701. 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  Id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.c.  The Sixth Circuit vacated the order and remanded, 
instructing the district court to make a finding on the merits of Perich’s discrimination claim.  EEOC 
v. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012). 
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Clauses of the First Amendment bar . . . an [employment discrimination] 
action when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the 
group’s ministers.”318  Roberts moved through the history of the Religion 
Clauses and the development of church autonomy.319  He ended the journey 
by acknowledging that the ministerial exception has been recognized by the 
circuit courts for many years and adopted it into Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.320 
Perich argued that there is no need for a special rule rooted in the 
Religion Clauses when the same First Amendment rights that protect 
everyone else also protect ministers.321  The Court declined the invitation to 
hold thusly.322  It next refused to adopt Perich’s position that the ministerial 
exception could not stand in light of Smith.323  Like the District of Columbia 
Circuit,324 the Court concluded that the Smith decision was unrelated to the 
application of the ministerial exception.325 
Nothing about the Court’s conclusions up to this point was surprising, as 
the circuits had held unanimously thus for over forty years.326  The aspect of 
the Court’s decision that had been eagerly anticipated—the aspect that had 
garnered national attention—was the Court’s explication of a rule defining 
the boundaries of a ministerial position under the exception.327  The Court, 
 
 318.  Id. at 699. By framing the question thusly, the Court immediately demonstrated its 
unwillingness to establish a clear ministerial employee test by addressing the issue on which the 
circuit courts agree, rather than the one that has created such disparity among them.  Since McClure, 
the circuits courts have universally recognized that the ministerial exception exists.  See supra Parts 
II.C, III.A; see also infra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 319.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702–05; see also supra Part II. 
 320.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–06 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized 
the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes 
application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious 
institution and its ministers. We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”). 
 321.  Id. at 706.  This proposition contravenes Watson and its progeny.  See supra Part II.A.2.a.  
The Court is quite right in calling Perich’s position “untenable” when the importance of the church-
minister relationship is so well established.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706; supra notes 159–
66 and accompanying text.  Justice Scalia particularly was unimpressed with the argument.  Oral 
Argument at 31:15, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553 (“We are 
talking here about the Free Exercise Clause and about the Establishment Clause, and you say they 
have no special application? . . . [Y]ou can, by an extension of First Amendment rights, derive such 
a [result], but there, black on white in the text of the Constitution are special protections for religion.  
And you say that makes no difference?”). 
 322.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  The Court did not take the time to discuss in detail the reasons behind its dismissal of this 
proposition; however, the District of Columbia Circuit thoroughly justified its reasoning in EEOC v. 
Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 325.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 326.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 327.  See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, THE BECKET FUND, 
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however, was “reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.”328  Instead, it delineated all the facts that, 
according to the Court, put Perich squarely within the exception.329 
It placed heavy emphasis on the fact that both the church and Perich 
herself held her out to the world as a minister to the congregation.330  The 
church did so by giving Perich the official title of minister, while Perich did 
so by claiming housing allowances on her taxes, accepting the call from 
Hosanna-Tabor, and referring to herself as a minister in written 
correspondence.331  The Court gave substantially more weight to Perich’s 
title as minister than did the Sixth Circuit before it;332 however, while the 
Court said that the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that a title is not 
relevant,333 it did not consider as a factor the title alone.334  Chief Justice 
Roberts considered the title only because of the significant amount of 
religious training that accompanied it: 
 Perich’s title as a minister reflected a significant degree of 
religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning.  
To be eligible to become a commissioned minister, Perich had to 
complete eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical 
interpretation, church doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran 
teacher.  She also had to obtain the endorsement of her local Synod 
district by submitting a petition that contained her academic 
transcripts, letters of recommendation, personal statement, and 
written answers to various ministry-related questions.  Finally, she 
had to pass an oral examination by a faculty committee at a 
 
http://www.becketfund.org/hosannatabor/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (listing press publications 
regarding Hosanna-Tabor). 
 328.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.  Chief Justice Roberts was satisfied “that the exception 
cover[ed] Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”  Id. 
 329.  Id. at 707–08. 
 330.  Id. at 707. 
 331.  Id. at 707–08. 
 332.  Id. at 708 (“It was wrong for the Court of Appeals—and Perich, who has adopted the court’s 
view—to say that an employee’s title does not matter.” (citation omitted)). 
 333.  Id. (“Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an 
employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is the fact that 
significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of the 
employee’s position.”). 
 334.  Id. at 707. 
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Lutheran college.  It took Perich six years to fulfill these 
requirements.335 
The reasoning behind the Court’s conclusion that title is a relevant factor is 
undermined by the fact that it felt the need to support that conclusion with 
evidence, not of Perich’s title, but of her extensive religious training.336  In 
holding that the title of minister always carries significant weight, the Court 
ignored a possible factual scenario in which someone is given the title 
arbitrarily.337 
The Court criticized the primary duties test when it disagreed with the 
weight the Sixth Circuit gave to the fact that lay and contract teachers at 
Hosanna-Tabor had the same duties, as well as to the fact that Perich 
performed many secular duties.338  Because the Sixth Circuit used the 
primary duties test, the functional comparison between the two types of 
teachers was given substantial weight.339  The only basis the Court gave for 
this conclusion, however, was that contract teachers were only hired when 
called teachers were unavailable.340  In rejecting the secular duties 
emphasis,341 the Court took a position similar to that of the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, which both expressed concerns about a purely functional 
approach.342  The Court seemed to accept the general idea that some 
employment relationships “may be so pervasively religious” that the number 
of secular duties becomes irrelevant.343 
Finally, the Court did speak on one unsettled issue.  Throughout church 
autonomy and ministerial exception jurisprudence, as well as the Hosanna-
Tabor oral arguments, the issue of the so-called “pretextual question” 
continued to arise.344  The Court, however, dismissed the issue with haste: 
 
 335.  Id. 
 336.  Id. at 707–08. 
 337.  This holding also makes interesting Justice Alito’s observation that “some faiths consider 
the ministry to consist of all or a very large percentage of their members.”  Id. at 713–14 (Alito, J., 
concurring); see also supra note 357 and accompanying text.  If the title of minister weighs heavily 
in favor of applying the exception, it should follow that there are some faiths wherein the exception 
would apply to every member.  The Fourth Circuit in Dole specifically dismissed this possibility.  
See supra text accompanying note 182. 
 338.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708. 
 339.  See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see also supra Part III.A.1.c. 
 340.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708. 
 341.  Id. at 709 (“The issue before us . . . is not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch.”). 
 342.  See supra Parts III.A.2.b–c.  The Ninth Circuit, of course, vacated this conclusion.  See 
supra note 235. 
 343.  See supra text accompanying note 231. 
 344.  See supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90, 279, 286, 288 and accompanying text; see also Oral 
Argument at 46:30, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553. 
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 The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted 
religious reason for firing Perich—that she violated the Synod’s 
commitment to internal dispute resolution—was pretextual.  That 
suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception.  The 
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to 
fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.  The 
exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control 
who will minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—
is the church’s alone.345 
In this brief statement, the Court rejected the idea that it is appropriate to 
examine a church’s decision for “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness”346 and to 
deny ministerial exception protection on those grounds.347  This conclusion 
is supported by ample precedent holding that, in general, “It is not within the 
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a 
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”348 
3.  Justices Thomas and Alito Concur 
Despite the Court’s surprising 9–0 decision, Justices Thomas and Alito 
added concurring opinions expressing views tangential to the Court’s 
holding.349  Justice Thomas did not add much to the majority opinion, except 
to say that “[t]he question whether an employee is a minister is itself 
religious in nature,”350 a point that echoes the Ninth Circuit’s in Alcazar that 
the “very process of civil court inquiry into the clergy-church relationship 
can be sufficient entanglement.”351 
Justice Alito clarified his view on the confusion surrounding the term 
“minister.”352  He made it clear that the term should only be thought of as a 
 
 345.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (citation omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).  This conclusion 
invalidates reasoning in multiple circuit cases.  See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 346.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 347.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709. 
 348.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Hernandez v. 
Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)); see also supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90, 279 and accompanying 
text. 
 349.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 
711 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 350.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 351.  Supra notes 236, 283 and accompanying text. 
 352.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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type of “shorthand” because if taken literally, it would surely exclude some 
of the many different religions represented in the United States.353  He took a 
somewhat radical view on what type of employee should fall under the 
ministerial exception.  Justice Alito argued that autonomy must be 
maintained because “[f]orcing a group to accept certain members may 
impair [its ability] to express those views, and only those views, that it 
intends to express.”354  He said religious groups are “the archetype of 
associations formed for expressive purposes, and their fundamental rights 
surely include the freedom to choose who is qualified to serve as a voice for 
their faith.”355  These ideas support the argument that all employees of a 
religious organization should fall under the ministerial exception, depending 
on what a church considers an action that gives “a voice” to their faith.356  A 
church could argue that employment of an individual in any position is a 
tacit admission that the individual’s beliefs are representative of those held 
by the religious organization as a whole.  Justice Alito continued this theme 
by pointing out that many churches consider most, if not all, of their 
members to be ministers.357 
IV.  WHAT HAPPENS NOW: THE AD HOC TEST ARGUMENT (THE SENSIBLE 
SOLUTION) 
The Court deliberately and specifically avoided settling the questions 
raised by the application of the ministerial exception.358  Ruling on the case 
more quickly and in more agreement than most constitutional law scholars 
predicted, the Court’s only aim was to adopt the ministerial exception while 
avoiding the “tough constitutional question.”359  The Court dismissed the 
“parade of horribles” espoused by the government in Hosanna-Tabor that 
included sexual harassment and other such torts.360  The Court was quite 
 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  Id. at 712 (alterations in original) (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 
(2000)); see also infra note 357. 
 355.  Id. at 713. 
 356.  Id.; see also supra note 351. 
 357.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713–14.  This marked the second time Justice Alito implied 
that perhaps all members of the church should be covered by the exception.  It first occurred when 
he quoted Dale without any attempt to distinguish between the words “member” and “employee.”  
Id. at 712; see also supra notes 337, 351 and accompanying text.  This is an interesting and 
seemingly meritorious proposition, but its examination is outside the scope of this Comment. 
 358.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 359.  Oral Argument at 46:30, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 
S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553. 
 360.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.  The circuits have generally agreed that such claims 
would not be barred.  See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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right; that will not be the lasting problem created by the decision.361 
The circuit courts have not been able to agree on a clear test and at times 
have even contradicted themselves.362  The only possible direction the 
circuits can take from the Supreme Court’s decision—though not ironclad—
is that it seems that the Court does not agree with the primary duties test.363  
However, even this conclusion requires an inference because the Court held 
(very narrowly) only that the exception exists and that it applied to Perich.364  
This leaves the circuits, as they have done for forty years, to fend for 
themselves.  Given that strategy’s past application and resulting confusing,365 
this is not exactly an encouraging prospect. 
In Rweyemamu, the Second Circuit, though not dealing with the 
application of a ministerial employee test, nonetheless explicated an ad hoc-
type test that most accurately reflects the spirit of the ministerial 
exception.366  By acknowledging that the relationship in question may be “so 
pervasively religious” as to warrant a ministerial finding, the court 
recognized that these are questions of such complexity that a blanket rule 
may not be possible.367  The inconsistencies in other circuit decisions also 
demonstrate that this issue should be examined on a case-by-case basis.368  
Many courts have acknowledged that “virtually every religion in the world is 
represented in the population of the United States.”369  With different 
religions come different doctrines and different ideas of what constitutes a 
ministerial position.370  As has been shown, it is possible to have a 
“pervasively religious” position that comprises mostly secular duties.371 
Creating an inflexible rule or list of criteria, such as the primary duties 
test, will only lead to more inconsistent holdings like those in the circuit 
 
 361.  Supra note 358. 
 362.  See supra Part III.B. 
 363.  See supra notes 338–43 and accompanying text. 
 364.  See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text. 
 365.  See supra Part III.B. 
 366.  See supra Part II.C. 
 367.  Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).  The fact that the Supreme Court 
chose to rule so narrowly in Hosanna-Tabor also supports this conclusion.  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 368.  See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the inconsistent application of the primary duties test). 
 369.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 370.  For example, Justice Alito recognized the diversity when he criticized the Christian 
connotation of the exception because “the concept of ordination as understood by most Christian 
churches and by Judaism has no clear counterpart in some Christian denominations and some other 
religions.”  Id. 
 371.  See supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text. 
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courts.372  Church autonomy is at the root of the ministerial exception,373 and 
it is based on a religious organization’s fundamental right—a right that 
surpasses the government’s interest in eradicating discrimination—“to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”374  This conflict between 
fundamental rights is too substantial to support anything but a fact-intensive 
analysis.  Each ministerial exception case should, as Rweyemamu suggests, 
look at the nature of the dispute.  This way, the courts can determine 
whether the exception is required to maintain a religious organization’s right 
of autonomy that is based in the Religion Clauses.375 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is much breadth to the church autonomy doctrine.  One aspect of 
it—the ministerial exception—requires courts to answer difficult 
constitutional questions that arise when two fundamental rights conflict.  
While the Supreme Court has established that the Religion Clauses 
supersede the government’s interest in enforcing anti-discrimination laws,376 
its unwillingness to explicate or adopt a clear ministerial employee test 
leaves open the question of the shape and extent of the exception.  As long 
as they do not directly contradict Hosanna-Tabor—a near impossibility—
the circuit courts likely will continue to apply tests of their own design.  As 
articulated in this Comment, an ad hoc approach that examines the religious 
nature of the position in question would cause the least amount of 
confusion.377  In order to avoid inconsistent application of the ministerial 
exception, the circuit courts should utilize this ad hoc test until the Supreme 
Court speaks on this issue again. 
Summer E. Allen* 
 
 
 372.  See supra Parts III.A.1.a, III.A.1.c, III.B.1. 
 373.  See supra Parts II.A.2, II.C. 
 374.  Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952). 
 375.  The test articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Starkman is also essentially ad hoc and holds true 
to the spirit of the exception.  See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. 
 376.  See supra Parts II.A.2.a, II.C, III.C.2. 
 377.  See supra notes 366–75 and accompanying text. 
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